# devalue Like `JSON.stringify`, but handles - cyclical references (`obj.self = obj`) - repeated references (`[value, value]`) - `undefined`, `Infinity`, `NaN`, `-0` - regular expressions - dates - `Map` and `Set` - `BigInt` - custom types via replacers, reducers and revivers Try it out [here](https://svelte.dev/repl/138d70def7a748ce9eda736ef1c71239?version=3.49.0). ## Goals: - Performance - Security (see [XSS mitigation](#xss-mitigation)) - Compact output ## Non-goals: - Human-readable output - Stringifying functions ## Usage There are two ways to use `devalue`: ### `uneval` This function takes a JavaScript value and returns the JavaScript code to create an equivalent value — sort of like `eval` in reverse: ```js import * as devalue from 'devalue'; let obj = { message: 'hello' }; devalue.uneval(obj); // '{message:"hello"}' obj.self = obj; devalue.uneval(obj); // '(function(a){a.message="hello";a.self=a;return a}({}))' ``` Use `uneval` when you want the most compact possible output and don't want to include any code for parsing the serialized value. ### `stringify` and `parse` These two functions are analogous to `JSON.stringify` and `JSON.parse`: ```js import * as devalue from 'devalue'; let obj = { message: 'hello' }; let stringified = devalue.stringify(obj); // '[{"message":1},"hello"]' devalue.parse(stringified); // { message: 'hello' } obj.self = obj; stringified = devalue.stringify(obj); // '[{"message":1,"self":0},"hello"]' devalue.parse(stringified); // { message: 'hello', self: [Circular] } ``` Use `stringify` and `parse` when evaluating JavaScript isn't an option. ### `unflatten` In the case where devalued data is one part of a larger JSON string, `unflatten` allows you to revive just the bit you need: ```js import * as devalue from 'devalue'; const json = `{ "type": "data", "data": ${devalue.stringify(data)} }`; const data = devalue.unflatten(JSON.parse(json).data); ``` ## Custom types You can serialize and deserialize custom types by passing a second argument to `stringify` containing an object of types and their _reducers_, and a second argument to `parse` or `unflatten` containing an object of types and their _revivers_: ```js class Vector { constructor(x, y) { this.x = x; this.y = y; } magnitude() { return Math.sqrt(this.x * this.x + this.y * this.y); } } const stringified = devalue.stringify(new Vector(30, 40), { Vector: (value) => value instanceof Vector && [value.x, value.y] }); console.log(stringified); // [["Vector",1],[2,3],30,40] const vector = devalue.parse(stringified, { Vector: ([x, y]) => new Vector(x, y) }); console.log(vector.magnitude()); // 50 ``` If a function passed to `stringify` returns a truthy value, it's treated as a match. You can also use custom types with `uneval` by specifying a custom replacer: ```js devalue.uneval(vector, (value, uneval) => { if (value instanceof Vector) { return `new Vector(${value.x},${value.y})`; } }); // `new Vector(30,40)` ``` Note that any variables referenced in the resulting JavaScript (like `Vector` in the example above) must be in scope when it runs. ## Error handling If `uneval` or `stringify` encounters a function or a non-POJO that isn't handled by a custom replacer/reducer, it will throw an error. You can find where in the input data the offending value lives by inspecting `error.path`: ```js try { const map = new Map(); map.set('key', function invalid() {}); uneval({ object: { array: [map] } }); } catch (e) { console.log(e.path); // '.object.array[0].get("key")' } ``` ## XSS mitigation Say you're server-rendering a page and want to serialize some state, which could include user input. `JSON.stringify` doesn't protect against XSS attacks: ```js const state = { userinput: ``; ``` Which would result in this: ```html ``` Using `uneval` or `stringify`, we're protected against that attack: ```js const template = ` `; ``` ```html ``` This, along with the fact that `uneval` and `stringify` bail on functions and non-POJOs, stops attackers from executing arbitrary code. Strings generated by `uneval` can be safely deserialized with `eval` or `new Function`: ```js const value = (0, eval)('(' + str + ')'); ``` ## Other security considerations While `uneval` prevents the XSS vulnerability shown above, meaning you can use it to send data from server to client, **you should not send user data from client to server** using the same method. Since it has to be evaluated, an attacker that successfully submitted data that bypassed `uneval` would have access to your system. When using `eval`, ensure that you call it _indirectly_ so that the evaluated code doesn't have access to the surrounding scope: ```js { const sensitiveData = 'Setec Astronomy'; eval('sendToEvilServer(sensitiveData)'); // pwned :( (0, eval)('sendToEvilServer(sensitiveData)'); // nice try, evildoer! } ``` Using `new Function(code)` is akin to using indirect eval. ## See also - [lave](https://github.com/jed/lave) by Jed Schmidt - [arson](https://github.com/benjamn/arson) by Ben Newman. The `stringify`/`parse` approach in `devalue` was inspired by `arson` - [oson](https://github.com/KnorpelSenf/oson) by Steffen Trog - [tosource](https://github.com/marcello3d/node-tosource) by Marcello Bastéa-Forte - [serialize-javascript](https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript) by Eric Ferraiuolo - [jsesc](https://github.com/mathiasbynens/jsesc) by Mathias Bynens - [superjson](https://github.com/blitz-js/superjson) by Blitz - [next-json](https://github.com/iccicci/next-json) by Daniele Ricci ## License [MIT](LICENSE)

c	File Name	Size	files	T	Date
zip	src/	16735	5	---	2025-04-22 22:59:17
zip	types/	1096	2	---	2025-04-22 22:59:17
-	LICENSE	1121		%	2025-04-22 22:59:17
-	README.md	6130		md	2025-04-22 22:59:17
-	index.js	141		js	2025-04-22 22:59:17
-	package.json	657		json	2025-04-22 22:59:17

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